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 In the first book of Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Richard Hooker offers the 
following account of the origins of human sociality, the moment when the individual, upon 
the discovery of personal insufficiency and the advantages of cooperation, makes the 
transition from a state of nature to social compact: 
 
But forasmuch as we are not by ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselves with competent 
store of things needful for such a life as our nature doth desire, a life fit for the dignity of 
man; therefore to supply those defects and imperfections which are in us living single and 
solely by ourselves, we are naturally induced to seek communion and fellowship with 
others. This was the cause of men’s uniting themselves at the first in politic Societies, 
which societies could not be without Government, nor Government without a distinct kind 
of Law from that which hath been already declared. Two foundations there are which bear 
up public societies; the one, a natural inclination, whereby all men desire sociable life and 
fellowship; the other, an order expressly or secretly agreed upon touching the manner of 
their union in living together. The latter is that which we call the Law of a Commonweal, 
the very soul of a politic body, the parts whereof are by law animated, held together, and 
set on work in such actions, as the common good requireth. Laws politic, ordained for 
external and regiment order amongst men, are never framed as they should be, unless 
presuming the will of man to be inwardly obstinate, rebellious, and averse from all 
obedience unto the sacred laws of his nature; in a word, unless presuming man to be in 
regard of his depraved mind little better than a wild beast, they do accordingly provide 
notwithstanding so to frame his outward actions, that they be no hindrance unto the 
common good for which societies are instituted: unless they do this, they are not perfect. It 
resteth therefore that we consider how nature findeth out such laws of government as serve 
to direct even nature depraved to a right end. (1.10.1)1   
 
The passage is an intense parabolic assertion of a principle that is central to Hooker’s 
argument: human beings are by nature simultaneously sociable and anti-social. They deeply 
need and desire social affiliation, yet they reflexively and perversely subvert their own best 
interests because “the will of man . . . [is] inwardly obstinate, rebellious, and averse from all 
obedience unto the sacred laws of his nature.” Thus, a secondary order of law – “Laws 
politic” – is needed, not merely to restrain anti-social violations of the common good but 
also, over the course of time, to transform the will, redirecting “nature depraved to a right 
end.” This vision of human nature and the social order undergirds the polemical project of the 
Laws: the refutation of the Puritan dissidents, led by Thomas Cartwright, who are urged to 
abandon their destructive attempts to impose a Presbyterian “discipline” on the Church of 
                                                           
1 All references to Hooker’s Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity from The Everyman’s Library Edition , 
(London: J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1907). All references to The Taming of the Shrew are from The Riverside 
Shakespeare, eds. G. Blakemore Evans et al., 2d ed., (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997).  
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England and instead embrace the Elizabethan settlement on the basis of the laws of nature 
and reason. Hooker’s appeal is inclusive; he wishes to absorb his opponents rather than 
isolate or exclude them. In doing so, he argues on pragmatic rather than idealistic grounds: 
the English state church is not perfect but rather sufficient, and there is no reason the “private 
discretion” of his opponents should preclude submission to “that way…the public judgment 
of the Church hath thought better” (1.16.7). The Taming of the Shrew contains a parallel 
argument: Petruchio refutes Katherine’s ‘heretical’ non-conformity by staging  a persuasive 
demonstration of the benefits of married mutuality – material security, social esteem, love, 
and happiness – thereby reconciling a hostile, dissenting subject to an imperfect but 
necessary social order.  In Petruchio’s successful persuasion of his wife, the comedy portrays 
the result for which Hooker strives: the re-socialization of the polemical opponent and her 
rational, willing reintegration into a harmonious communal body. 
 
 While the intellectual and literary influence of the Laws on Shakespeare’s histories, 
tragedies, and problem plays has long been established,2 little has been said about its 
relevance to the comedies, and nothing, to my knowledge, about The Taming of the Shrew. 
The two works are almost exactly contemporary. Hooker published the first four books of the 
Laws in 1593, and the writing of Shrew has been dated between 1590-1594, so it  is possible 
that Shakespeare read Hooker’s work prior to or during composition. I am not expressly 
concerned, however, about proving direct literary influence. Rather I treat these texts as 
analogous treatments of the same issue – the problem of dissent in early modern England 3– 
which both pose the problems and resolve them in strikingly similar terms. By employing 
Hooker’s Laws as a kind of interpretive key to Shrew, I hope to illuminate the play in a 
variety of ways but particularly to show that its treatment of conjugal strife has broad 
implications which transcend the more limited contexts of “early modern marriage” or the 
“woman question”; indeed, in the politically loaded language of her final speech, Katherine 
herself constructs a powerful analogy between dissent within the family and rebellion within 
the state:  
 
   Such duty as the subject owes a prince, 
Even such a woman oweth to her husband; 
And when she is forward, peevish, sullen, sour, 
What is she but a foul contending rebel, 
And graceless traitor to her loving lord? 
I am asham’d that women are so simple 
To offer war where they should kneel for peace, 
Or seek for rule, supremacy, and sway, 
When they are bound to serve, love, and obey.  
                                                           
2 See Virgil K. Whitaker, Shakespeare’s Use of Learning: An Inquiry into the Growth of his Mind & Art, (San 
Marino, Cal.: The Huntington Library, 1953), 206-208. See also Eileen Cohen, “The Visible Solemnity: 
Ceremony and Order in Shakespeare and Hooker,” Texas Studies in Literature and Language 12 (1970): 181-
195. 
3 While it is clear that Hooker is engaged with this issue, it is perhaps less clear that Katherine’s shrewishness 
constitutes social dissent. But many readers of the play have come to this conclusion. For example, George Ian 
Duthie, in  Shakespeare, (London: Hutchinson’s University Library, 1951), argues that Katherine is a super-
individualist who attempts to make a law for herself, thereby violating the orthodox Elizabethan doctrine of 
order, hierarchy, and degree: “In refusing to accord her husband implicit obedience, Katharine is offending 
against the divinely established order of things-- her conduct is unnatural….It is as if in the little kingdom of 
Petruchio’s family there had been a civil war….An insubordinate wife corresponds to a rebellious subject” (43, 
53, 57, 58, 59). Unless, this underlying conception of hierarchical order is kept in mind, he argues, we are apt to 
misread the play (57). 
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(5.2.155-
164) 
 
I also hope to demonstrate that the play is more intellectually coherent than its critics 
routinely suggest4 and to counter several common streams of interpretation which fail to do 
the play justice: that Shrew is a brutal chauvinistic spectacle in which the male protagonist 
intimidates and brainwashes his female counterpart into submission;5 that it is a satirical 
subversion of patriarchal ideology6; that it is the product of radical ideological ambivalence 
or schizophrenia.7 Such readings tend to be more concerned with either dismissing or 
valorizing the work on the basis of contemporary ideological orthodoxies than with 
understanding it on its own terms and in its historical setting. The same is true of 
interpretations of Hooker that portray him as an arch-conservative propagandist justifying an 
evil status quo.8 As C.S. Lewis argued long ago, we don’t read Hooker today because we 
accept his ecclesiology as authoritative, nor is his work a failure because he didn’t happen to 
foresee the advent of the modern secular state; Hooker answers his own age, and it is absurd 
to expect him to answer ours.9 Nevertheless, I hope to demonstrate that Of the Laws of 
Ecclesiastical Polity and The Taming of the Shrew, products of the same historical moment, 
articulate a common social vision which is of enduring value and permanent interest. 
 
The Grounds of Sociality 
 
 Hooker’s conception of sociality is founded on a profound tension between two 
distinct explanations for the origin of the social order.10 On the one hand, he affirms that 
                                                           
4 See, for example, H.J. Oliver’s Introduction to his edition of The Taming of the Shrew, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1982) where he claims that the play has little social or intellectual substance: “If as Meredith said in his 
Essay on Comedy, the test of true comedy is that it should awaken thoughtful laughter, probably The Taming of 
the Shrew qualifies – but only just” (37). 
5 See Emily Detmer, “Civilizing Subordination: Domestic Violence and The Taming of the Shrew,” 
Shakespeare Quarterly 48 (1997): 273-294; Katherine A. Sirluck, “Patriarchy, Pedagogy, and the Divided Self 
in The Taming of the Shrew,” University of Toronto Quarterly 60 (1991): 417, 420; and Dorothea Kehler, 
“Echoes of the Induction in The Taming of the Shrew,” Renaissance Papers (1986): 42. 
6 See Robert Ornstein, Shakespeare’s Comedies: From Roman Farce to Romantic Mystery, (Newark: University 
of Delaware Press, 1986), 68-72; Harold Goddard, The Meaning of Shakespeare, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1951), 70-71; Coppelia Kahn, “The Taming of the Shrew: Shakespeare’s Mirror of Marriage,” 
Modern Language Studies 5 (1975): 88-102.  
7 See Richard A. Burt, “Charisma, Coercion, and Comic Form in The Taming of the Shrew,” Criticism 26 
(1984): 307; Thomas Moisan, “‘What’s that to you?’ or, Facing Facts: Anti-Paternalist Chords and Social 
Discords in the Taming of the Shrew,” Renaissance Drama 26 (1995): 106, 112, 122-123; Karen Newman, 
“Renaissance Family Politics and Shakespeare’s The Taming of the Shrew,” English Literary Renaissance 16 
(1986): 99-100.   
8 See Richard Helgerson, Forms of Nationhood: The Elizabethan Writing of England, (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1992), 272. Yet, as Conal Condren argues in “The Creation of Hooker’s Public Authority: 
Rhetoric, Reputation and Reassessment,” The Journal of Religious History 21 (1997), such terms as “status 
quo” and “conservative” are perilously applied to Hooker’s thought, not least because they are anachronistic 
(36, 39). 
9 C.S. Lewis, English Literature in the Sixteenth Century Excluding Drama (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1954), 458-459. Interestingly, Lewis makes a similar point about ‘presentist’ interpretations of The 
Taming of the Shrew. He argues that attempts to undermine the hierarchical doctrine in Katherine’s final speech 
by suggesting that she is being tactical or ironical do not stand up to scrutiny: “The words, thus taken at their 
face value, are very startling to a modern audience; but those who cannot face such a startling should not read 
old books” (Lewis, A Preface to Paradise Lost, [New York: Oxford University Press, 1942], 75-76). 
10 See William J Bouwsma, “Hooker in the Context of European Cultural History,” in Religion and Culture in 
Renaissance England, eds. Claire McEachern and Debora Shuger, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 144-145. See also John S. Marshall, Hooker and the Anglican Tradition: An Historical and Theological 
Study of Hooker’s Ecclesiastical Polity, (Sewanee, Tenn.: The University Press at the University of the South, 
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natural law impels human beings toward social affiliation and that this impulse is the ground 
of all “politic Societies.” On the other hand, he doubts their ability to live in community 
without the intervention of coercive authority, in the form of “laws politic,” imposed by 
rulers on unregenerate subjects for their own good. Or, to put it a different way, he recognizes 
a distinction between civil society and the state, though he does not define either term 
precisely, detail their historical development, or demarcate their functions.11  Indeed, for 
Hooker, any participant in civil society is also subject to state authority, since politic societies 
“could not be without Government, nor Government without a distinct kind of Law from that 
which hath been already declared” (1.10.1). Civil society, the arena of social reciprocity, 
“doth more content the nature of man than any private kind of solitary living, because in 
society this good of mutual participation is so much larger than otherwise” (1.10.12), 
satisfying the needs of individuals. Yet this ‘feel-good’ aspect of social compact is not viable 
without subjection to a secondary order of laws which undoubtedly has a coercive aspect: 
“Jurisdiction is a yoke which law hath imposed on the necks of men in such sort that they 
must endure it for the good of others, how contrary soever it be to their own particular 
appetites and inclinations . . . jurisdiction bridleth men against their wills” (5.62.16). Hooker 
does not sentimentalize or idealize the state, but readily acknowledges that “external and 
regiment order” may at times exert painful restraint upon the personal liberty of subjects. Yet, 
he argues, even restraint and coercion are beneficial in ways of which the individual is often 
unaware. 
 
The foregoing account of sociality corresponds closely to The Taming of the Shrew, 
first in its representation of the tension between social and anti-social impulses, between 
sociality as innate desire and as ‘regimented’ standard. On the one hand, the play affirms the 
universal desirability and abundant benefits of social affiliation: “Padua affords nothing but 
what is kind” (5.2.14). The male characters in particular enter enthusiastically into alliances 
and cooperative ventures:  “this bar in law makes us friends” (1.1.135-136); “And do as 
adversaries do in law, / Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends” (1.2.276-77). On the 
other hand, social life, particularly courtship, is portrayed as ruthlessly competitive, and 
cooperation itself a mask for undermining one’s rivals: “See, to beguile the old folks, how the 
young folks lay their heads together!” (1.2.138-39). Moreover, the play depicts many 
violations of the cooperative ethic – deception, fraud, physical violence, ridicule, intimidation 
– and the distinction between the social and anti-social is often fuzzy.  The Lord’s 
manipulation of Sly in the Induction, for example, is ambiguous: potentially both generous 
and cruel, arguably an act of both inclusion and sharp social definition. But the precarious 
balance between the social and anti-social is registered most vividly in the interaction 
between its volatile protagonists. Petruchio’s address to Katherine alternates between 
bullying and loving deference; he coerces her into experiencing the via negativa of physical 
privation and homeopathic therapy, all the while contending, quite plausibly, that “all is done 
in reverend care of her” (4.1.204).  
 
Hooker and Petruchio both launch their ‘arguments’ by demonstrating that their 
polemical opponents are creatures subject to the various orders of law. Hooker’s theory of 
law, as Damian Grace points out, is neither voluntaristic nor imperative, but rather “rational, 
a principle governing the motions of all things to their proper ends.”12 Law is “any kind of 
rule or canon whereby actions are framed” (1.3.1), and thus “all things therefore do work 
after a sort according to law” (1.2.2). Hooker argues in an Aristotelian vein that all created 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
1963), 93, 105.  
11 Marshall, 103-106. 
12 Damian Grace, “Natural Law in Hooker,” The Journal of Religious History 21 (1997): 11. 
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things “are somewhat in possibility, which as yet they are not in act. And for this cause there 
is in all things an appetite or desire, whereby they incline to something which they may be; 
and when they are it, they shall be perfecter than now they are. All which perfections are 
contained under the general name of Goodness. And because there is not in the world any 
thing whereby another may not some way be made the perfecter, therefore all things that are, 
are good” (1.5.1). For Hooker, there is a clear relation then between law and teleology; law, 
among other things, provides a measure by which rational creatures may determine their 
relative progress toward the goal of perfection: “For he that knoweth what is straight doth 
even thereby discern what is crooked, because the absence of straightness in bodies capable 
thereof is crookedness. Goodness in actions is like unto straightness; wherefore that which is 
done well we term right. For as the straight way is most acceptable to him that travelleth, 
because by it he cometh soonest to his journey’s end; so in action, that which doth lie the 
evenest between us and the end we desire must needs be the fittest for our use” (1.8.1).   
 
Judged in this light, Hooker’s Puritan opponents can be both affirmed and criticized. 
On the positive side, he can say that they possess substantial goodness, both realized and 
potential, and that they have been endowed with a God-given purpose and the capability to 
fulfil it. Moreover, he notes approvingly their strong appetite or desire for rectitude as 
manifest in their “right well affected and most religiously inclined minds” (Pref.1.2), their 
“wonderful zeal and fervour” (Pref.1.2) and “fervent earnestness” (Pref. 3.10). On the 
negative side, he finds them “crooked” to the extent that they have misunderstood the nature 
of the good, the right, the fit, etc. and the means by which these ends might best be achieved. 
That they have “swerve[d] utterly from that which is right” (Pref.6.3) is revealed by their 
contempt for the very laws provided for their guidance and to which they have already given 
their tacit assent: “A law is the deed of the whole body politic, whereof if ye judge yourselves 
to be any part, then is the law even your deed also” (Pref.5.2). Another sign of the 
“crookedness” of the Puritan belligerents is their contrarianism and the manner in which they 
resist the claims of law. Hooker insist that “there is also in rectitude, beauty; as contrariwise 
in obliquity, deformity. And that which is good in the actions of men, doth not only delight as 
profitable, but as amiable also” (1.8.1). His opponents’ lack of amiability, their ugly 
irascibility, their “disdainful sharpness of wit” (Pref.2.10) and “marvellous exceeding 
severity and sharpness of reproof” (Pref.3.6) all indicate that they have departed from the 
“straight way.” 
 
In their first encounter, Petruchio offers a comparable analysis of his prospective 
bride. Unlike the other wooers who have demonized her as a “fiend of hell” (1.1.88), 
Petruchio assumes that Katherine, as a rational creature, possesses both an ample share of 
natural goodness as well as a craving for perfection, however glaring her apparent faults:  
 
   Hearing thy mildness praised in every town, 
Thy virtues spoke of, and thy beauty sounded,  
Yet not so deeply as to thee belongs, 
Myself and mov’d to woo thee for my wife. 
……………………………………………. 
   . . . . I find you passing gentle:  
‘Twas told me you were rough and coy and sullen, 
And now I find report a very liar; 
   For thou art pleasant, gamesome, passing courteous, 
But slow in speech, yet sweet as spring-time flowers. 
Thou canst not frown, thou canst not look askaunce, 
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Nor bite the lip, as angry wenches will, 
Nor hast thou pleasure to be cross in talk; 
But thou with mildness entertain’st thy wooers, 
With gentle conference, soft and affable.  
(2.1.142-252) 
 
These clever and partially ironic speeches simultaneously serve as an affirmation of 
Katherine’s manifest qualities (e.g. beauty, gamesomeness, verbal fluency), an incitement for 
her to cultivate a number of latent virtues (e.g. sweetness, mildness, gentleness, affability, 
courtesy), and an implied critique of her anti-sociality (e.g. roughness, sullenness, frowning, 
perverse pleasure in contradiction). Somewhat presumptuously to be sure, Petruchio 
distinguishes between what he considers her essential character and mere transitory 
behaviour; in Hooker’s terms, he depicts a Katherine who is “somewhat in possibility,” 
whetting her desire to “incline to something which [she] may be” (Laws  1.5.1). As Ruth 
Nevo observes, Petruchio manages to speak simultaneously to the person Katherine has been 
and the person she would like to be, “the self she has made of herself and the self she has 
hidden”:13   
 
Why does the world report that Kate doth limp?  
O sland’rous world! Kate like the hazel twig  
Is straight and slender, and as brown in hue 
As hazel-nuts, and sweeter than the kernel.  
(2.1.253-
256) 
 
Characteristically equivocal, in a single passage he both reminds her of her egregious and 
“crooked” public reputation, while affirming her potential for “straightness” or goodness.  
 
Petruchio also presumes to discern the ends Katherine most deeply desires and the 
most direct path to them. Just as all things pursue “general perfection . . . in desiring the 
continuance of their being” through “offspring and propagation” (Laws 1.5.2), Katherine, he 
insists, is designed by nature to participate in sex and procreation: “Women are made to bear, 
and so are you“ (2.1.200). Nature, he argues further, has designed them as ideal mates for one 
another; in Hooker’s terms, they are mutually suited to help each other achieve “such a life as 
our nature doth desire, a life fit for the dignity of man” (Laws 1.10.1): 
 
  Now, Kate, I am a husband for your turn, 
  For by this light, whereby I see thy beauty – 
    Thy beauty that doth make me like thee well – 
  Thou must be married to no man but me. 
          (2.1.272-
75)  
 
Though fully aware of her intense anti-sociality, Petruchio assumes that she also possesses a 
natural inclination toward cooperation and civility. And he affirms the crucial agency of 
social structures and institutions, particularly love and marriage, in reinforcing this natural 
proclivity:  
“‘tis a world to see / How tame, when men and women are alone, / A meacock wretch can 
                                                           
13 Ruth Nevo, Comic Transformations in Shakespeare, (London: Methuen, 1980), 48-49. 
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make the curstest shrew” (2.1.311-13).  It is futile to resist this process of socialization, he 
argues, because of the array of forces, both innate and extrinsic, which support it:  
 
   Thus in plain terms: your father hath consented 
   That you shall be my wife; your dowry ‘greed on;  
   And will you, nill you, I will marry you. 
   .    .    .    .    .    .    .    .    .    .    .    .    .    .  
   For I am he am born to tame you, Kate, 
   And bring you from a wild Kate to a Kate 
   Conformable as other household Kates. 
          (2.1.269-71, 276-78)  
 
While critics have typically seen in these lines mere chauvinistic bravado, viewed in relation 
to Hooker’s thought, they carry a different charge. Generally speaking, the laws of sociality 
outweigh personal preferences, and Katherine, a member of the social body, is obliged to be 
“conformable” for the common good: “so likewise another law there is, which toucheth them 
as they are sociable parts united into one body; a law which bindeth them each to serve unto 
other’s good, and all to prefer the good of the whole before whatsoever their own particular” 
(Laws 1.3.5). But, as Petruchio subsequently demonstrates, it is also in her own best interests 
for her excessive anti-sociality to be transformed into civility, and the institution best suited 
to reconcile her with the social order is marriage.  
 
Like Hooker’s Laws, however, the play acknowledges the genuine difficulty of 
transforming dissenting subjects into “conformable” ones. For Hooker half-measures will not 
do; he proposes to identify the root causes of his opponents’ intransigence, proposing a return 
to first principles in order to achieve deep, constructive insight: “to see wherein the harm 
which they feel consisteth, the seeds from which it sprang, and the method of curing it” 
(5.1.1).  He notes that, to the impatient mind accustomed to ordinary polemics, this search 
into roots and foundations will seem “dark, intricate, and unfamiliar” (1.1.2). To understand 
his argument requires sustained effort and concentration, a patient willingness to be led 
through a process of discovery by departing from beaten mental pathways (1.1.12). Indeed, 
the solution may at times appear superficially obscure, for, he maintains, “that which hath 
greatest force in the very things we see is notwithstanding itself oftentimes not seen” (1.1.2). 
Therefore, he urges his readers to withhold their judgment while he sets out the framework of 
general laws, for “what may seem dark at first will afterwards be found more plain, even as 
the later particular decisions will appear, I doubt not, more strong, when the other have been 
read before“ (1.1.2).  
 
Petruchio too recognizes that Katherine’s situation requires deep insight and radical 
measures. Seeking to probe the source of her intransigence, he adopts the roles of educator 
and physician:  
 
  I tell thee, Kate, [the meat was] burnt and drived away, 
  And I expressly am forbid to touch it; 
  For it engenders choler, planteth anger, 
And better ‘twere that both of us did fast, 
Since of ourselves, ourselves are choleric, 
Than feed it with such overroasted flesh. 
        (4.1.170-175) 
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Diagnosing her (and indeed himself) as naturally choleric, he prescribes a programme of 
privations aimed at eradicating marital hostility and aggression: “He kills her in her own 
humor”;  “This is a way to kill a wife with kindness” (4.1.180, 208). Here, as elsewhere, his 
tactics are oblique, or to use Hooker’s words, “dark, intricate.” Indeed, at their wedding, 
Petruchio excuses his indiscreet behaviour in terms that are analogous to Hooker’s defence of 
obliquity:   
 
Tedious it were to tell, and harsh to hear -- 
Sufficeth I am come to keep my word, 
Though in some part enforced to digress, 
Which at more leisure I will so excuse 
As you shall well be satisfied with all.  
(3.2.105-9) 
 
Like Hooker, Petruchio warns his audience against superficial judgments; they must “read” 
his “argument” in its entirety before assessing its relevance or efficacy. What may initially 
appear nonsensical or irrelevant will eventually be revealed as purposeful: “He hath some 
meaning in his mad attire” (3.2.124). Like the author of the Laws, Petruchio requests the 
freedom to pursue his seemingly obscure project without hindrance: “if you knew my 
business, / You would entreat me rather go than stay” (3.2.191-92). Throughout the 
remainder of the play, a process of negotiation and adjustment occurs in which the various 
claims of individuality and collectivity, public role and private reality, are worked out. This 
process can be characterized as rhetorical and polemical: Petruchio, like Hooker, 
methodically undermines his antagonist’s objections, offering an alternative vision of society, 
marriage, and the good life. 
 
Assessing the problem 
 
In many ways, Petruchio’s attitude and approach to Katherine mirror Hooker’s 
assessment of his Puritan opponents. Throughout the Laws, Hooker projects a sympathetic, 
conciliatory attitude toward them, addressing them as “beloved in our Lord and Saviour Jesus 
Christ” (Pref.1.1) and defusing their hostility by disclaiming any hint of malice: “Think not 
that ye read the words of one who bendeth himself as an adversary against the truth which ye 
have already embraced; but the words of one who desireth even to embrace together with you 
the self-same truth” (Pref.1.3). Like any polemicist, Hooker is interested in winning the 
argument, though not at the expense of truth, whose pursuit requires a thorough, sympathetic, 
and unbiased sifting of opposing positions, followed by a rational adjudication between the 
conflicting claims: “But the manner of men’s writing must not alienate our hearts from the 
truth, if it appear they have the truth…..We being as fully persuaded otherwise, it resteth that 
some kind of trial be used to find out which part is in error” (Pref.2.10). We can see this 
concern in his detailed, even-handed account of the origins of Presbyterian polity in Calvin’s 
Geneva.14 Hooker contends that he Puritan polemicists have gained a popular following 
                                                           
14 Hooker speaks of Calvin as “the wisest man that ever the French church did enjoy” and acknowledges his 
“admirable dexterity of wit, together with the helps of other learning which were his guides” (Pref.2.1). He 
charts the historical evolution of Genevan polity, which he portrays as a sensible compromise wisely suited to 
“what the present estate of Geneva did then require” (Pref.2.4), but by no means universally authoritative. 
Indeed, Calvin, with his prodigious biblical knowledge, was able to “espy in the whole Scripture of God nothing 
which might breed at the least a probable opinion of likelihood, that divine authority itself was the same way 
somewhat inclinable” (Pref.2.7), certainly nothing to justify the Puritan censure of episcopacy. Calvin, a great 
man, was ultimately fallible: “But wise men are men, and the truth is truth. That which Calvin did for 
establishment of his discipline, seemeth more commendable than that which he taught for the countenancing of 
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largely by disseminating propaganda and exploiting mass emotion and public discontent: 
“certain general inducements are used to make saleable your cause in gross; and when once 
men have cast a fancy towards it, any slight declaration of specialties will serve to lead 
forward men’s inclinable and prepared minds” (Pref.3.5). In contrast, he crafts an argument 
which is both rational and affective, appealing to “the force of their own discretion” and their 
“own secret judgment” (Pref.3.1), to the mind and the heart together (cf. Pref.1.3). His 
irenicism, then, is not merely strategic but is rooted in a respect for the inwardness – the 
“witness of the Spirit” to the heart – so highly valued by Puritans: “but my whole endeavour 
is to resolve the conscience, and to shew as near as I can what in this controversy the heart is 
to think, if it will follow the light of sound and sincere judgment, without either cloud of 
prejudice, or mist of passionate affection” (Pref.7.1). In the struggle to ascertain truth, the 
responses of the human heart cannot be ignored, yet the heart is not infallible or autonomous. 
Here, as elsewhere, Hooker distinguishes between mere subjectivism and a rightly ordered 
inwardness in which the heart submits to reason: “Neither wish we that men should do any 
thing which in their hears they are persuaded they ought not to do, but this persuasion ought 
(we say) to be fully settled in their hearts; that in litigious and controversed causes of such 
quality, the will of God is to have them do whatsoever the sentence of judicial and final 
decision shall determine, yea, though it seem in their private opinion to swerve utterly from 
that which is right” (Pref.6.3). Sincere religious conviction is good, but it must at times give 
way to this larger, more comprehensive social framework. Hooker’s ultimate goal is a 
transformation of perspective which will facilitate the promotion of mutuality and social 
harmony. Striving to avoid the kind of acrimonious stalemate which had characterized the 
Admonition controversy,15 Hooker professes his wish “to labour under the same yoke, . . . to 
be joined with you in bands of indissoluble love and amity, to live as if our persons being 
many our souls were but one” (Pref.9.3). 
 
Yet Hooker’s treatise is not universally irenic, for he frankly and pointedly identifies 
his antagonists’ faults. It would be more accurate to say that Hooker achieves a judicious 
balance between conciliation and denunciation. The puritans, he argues, are good, sincere 
men with an erroneous view of law, rendering them well-meaning but dangerous rebels to the 
social order. 16 The fundamental problem, he argues, is miseducation. Ignorant of the various 
orders of law to which they are subject, they are ill-equipped to live in community:  “Many 
men there are, than whom nothing is more commendable when they are singled; and yet in 
society with others none less fit to answer the duties which are looked for at their hands. Yea, 
I am persuaded, that of them with whom in this cause we strive, there are whose betters 
amongst men would be hardly found, if they did not live amongst men, but in some 
wilderness by themselves. The cause of which their disposition so unframable unto societies 
wherein they live, is, for that they discern not aright what place and force these several kinds 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
it established” (Pref.2.7). 
15 In English Literature in the Sixteenth Century, C.S. Lewis offer a brief but useful summary of the polemical 
contest between the Puritans – John Field, Thomas Wilcox, Thomas Cartwright, Walter Travers, William Fulke, 
John Udall, “Martin Marprelate” – and the Anglicans – John Whitgift, John Bridges, Thomas Cooper, and 
eventually Richard Hooker (441-463). For a more detailed account of the controversy, see Peter Lake, Anglicans 
and Puritans? Presbyterian and English Conformist Thought from Whitgift to Hooker, (London: Unwin Hyman, 
1988). 
16 See A.S. McGrade, “Hooker’s Polity and the Establishment of the English Church,” in Of the Laws of 
Ecclesiastical Polity. An Abridged Edition, eds. A.S. McGrade and Brian Vickers, (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1975), 11-40; W.D.J. Thompson ,“The Philosopher of the ‘Politic Society’: Richard Hooker as a Political 
Thinker,” in Studies in Richard Hooker: Essays Preliminary to an Edition of His Works, ed. W. Speed Hill, 
(Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University, 1972), 15; Brian Vickers “Hooker’s Prose Style,” in Of the Laws 
of Ecclesiastical Polity. An Abridged Edition, eds. A.S. McGrade and Brian Vickers, (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1975), 54. 
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of laws ought to have in all their actions” (1.16.6). Inordinately individualistic, Cartwright 
and his colleagues have raised private judgment to an idolatrous level: “By following the law 
of private reason, where the law of public should take place they breed disturbance” (1.16.6). 
Hooker argues that his opponents have made superficial judgments in religious matters, based 
on “some show of probability, and what seemeth in that sort convenient” (1.16.6). Yet these 
common errors can take on a socially and politically subversive aspect, for “except our own 
private and but probable resolutions be by the law of public determinations overruled, we 
take away all possibility of social life in the world” (1.16.5). Here as elsewhere, he tries to 
demonstrate to his opponents that they have no autonomous interests, that they are contingent 
members of a larger social body, essential to its completeness.  
 
One of the notable features of Hooker’s Laws is his insightful exploration of what 
might be called the “psychology of error.” He seeks not merely to demolish his opponents’ 
position but to understand their errors from the “inside,” as it were. Although he considers 
reason a generally sufficient guide for human conduct, he must concede that frequently the 
will declines from reason – through custom, prejudice, or sheer laziness17 -- and, once this 
occurs, error becomes exceedingly difficult to uproot. The core problem is pride.  Human 
beings hate to admit they are wrong; when challenged, they respond combatively, clinging 
stubbornly to erroneous views and resorting to desperate evasions: “so hard [is it] to wrest 
from any man’s mouth the plain acknowledgement of error, that what hath been once 
inconsiderately defended, the same is commonly persisted in, as long as wit by whetting itself 
is able to find out any shift, be it never so sleight, whereby to escape out of the hands of 
present contradiction” (3.5.1). Moreover, “when men’s affections do frame their opinions, 
they are in defence of error more earnest a great deal,” and mere emotional intensity and 
sincerity are taken as sufficient guarantees of truth  (Pref.3.10). Rational appeal in such cases 
becomes futile: “let any man of contrary opinion open his mouth to persuade them, they close 
up their ears, his reasons they weigh not” (Pref.3.14).  
 
In Shrew, Katherine’s “problems” are assessed in analogous terms, not least in the 
sympathetic treatment of her situation. Her resistance to the familial and social world in 
which she is entrenched is in some respects valid, as are her objections to the reductive label 
of “shrew.” The play legitimates her protest in a number of ways, particularly in its satirical 
exposure of courtship among the mercantile classes: “I pray you, sir, is it your will / To make 
a stale of me amongst these mates?”18 Indeed, to a certain extent, we, like Petruchio, delight 
in Katherine’s “shrewishness,” partly because many of the objects of her scorn deserve it, and 
partly because her verbal and physical violence reveal an active, spirited, and energetic 
personality. Moreover, as has often been pointed out, Katherine’s circumstances are 
extenuating, and her intense irascibility is at least partially explained by the fact that her 
father openly favours her manipulative, two-faced younger sister: “Nay, now I see / She is 
your treasure, she must have a husband; / I must dance barefoot on her wedding-day / And 
for your love to her lead apes in hell” (2.1.31-34). At various moments in the play, 
particularly in Katherine’s grief, we catch glimpses of an inwardness at variance with, and 
much richer than, the shrew stereotype: “Iwis it is not half way to her heart” (1.1.62); “Talk 
not to me, I will go sit and weep, / Till I can find occasion of revenge” (2.1.35-36); “I must 
forsooth be forc’d  / To give my hand oppos’d against my heart” (3.2.8-9); “Would Katherine 
had never seen him though!” (3.2.26); “she, poor soul, / Knows not which way to stand, to 
look, to speak,  / And sits as one new risen from a dream” (4.1.184-186); “My tongue will tell 
                                                           
17 See Hooker, Laws, Pref. 3.9; 1.1.1; 1.7.6-7.  
18 Many critics have explored Katherine’s status as a daughter in a patriarchal culture and a mercantile 
household and her defiance of gender norms. See, for example, Newman, “Family Politics,” 86-100. 
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the anger of my heart,  / Or else my heart concealing it will break” (4.3.77-78). In Hooker’s 
terms Katherine’s hostility is a “pardonable” error which “moveth compassion” because it is 
the product of aggravation and not fully volitional: “What we do against our wills, or 
constrainedly, we are not properly said to do it, because the motive cause of doing it is not in 
ourselves, but carrieth us, as if the wind should drive a feather in the air, we no whit 
furthering that whereby we are driven. In such cases therefore the evil which is done moveth 
compassion; men are pitied for it, as being rather miserable in such respect than culpable” 
(Laws 1.9.4).  
 
Petruchio, particularly in the initial stages of courtship, assesses Katherine along 
similar lines. It is important to see the non-conventional character of this assessment in that 
he affirms and embraces that which others take to be mere shrewishness. For example, in 
contrast with her censorious family and community, he trivializes or denies her aggression, 
insisting that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with his prospective bride: “I hear no harm“ 
(1.2.188); “And now I find report a very liar” (2.1.244); “yourself and all the world / That 
talked of her have talked amiss of her” (2.1.290-91). He even excuses her violence as 
misunderstood virtue. For example, when Hortensio returns with a lute broken over his head, 
Petruchio praises her energy and wit: “Now, by the world, it is a lusty wench! /  I love her ten 
times more than e’er I did. / O, how I long to have some chat with her!” (2.1.160-62). Like 
Hooker, Petruchio persistently addresses his opponent with courtesy, expressing his physical 
attraction (“The prettiest Kate in Christendom” [2.1.188]), loving regard (“To this most 
patient, sweet, and virtuous wife” [3.2.195]) and solicitude (“Come, Kate, and wash, and 
welcome heartily” [4.1.154]). He likewise achieves a balance of conciliation and 
denunciation in his address to Katherine. Even before he has met her, he recognizes the need 
for an unconventional polemical strategy which will assure her of his good will: 
 
Say that she rail, why then I’ll tell her plain  
She sings sweetly as a nightingale;  
Say that she frown, I’ll say she looks as clear 
As morning roses newly wash’d with dew; 
Say she be mute, and will not speak a word, 
Then I’ll commend her volubility, 
   And say she uttereth piercing eloquence . . . .  
(2.1.170-176) 
 
By countering Katherine’s hostility with compliments, he employs, like Hooker, almost 
inhuman tolerance and affability, a constitutional inability to take offence.  
 
While there is much is to be said on Katherine’s behalf, her outlook and behaviour are 
nevertheless defective in certain respects and stand in need of correction. From the standpoint 
of Hooker’s Laws, the root of Katherine’s misery is an erroneous view of the social order and 
her place within it. Basically, she fails to perceive the reciprocal and cooperative nature of 
social relations. She is, for example, individualistic to a fault, as indicated by her refrain at 
the wedding: “till I please myself” (3.2.209, 212). She is also peremptory, rude, and 
aggressively self-seeking, readily abrogating the desires of others in her “mad and headstrong 
humor“ (4.1.209). Wilful, proud, and imperious – “I will be angry. What hast thou to do? / . . 
. . Father, be quiet. He shall stay my leisure” (3.2.216-17) – she is also acutely sensitive to 
criticism, as illustrated by her violent response to ‘Litio’s’ attempts to correct her fingering in 
the lute lesson.  In Hooker’s terms, even when justly opposed or rebuked, she is one who 
“doth not stomach at such contradiction, storm[s] at reproof, and hate[s] such as would 
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reform [her]” (Laws 1.10.7). Even her admirably passionate defence of her right to self-
expression is tainted by solipsism: 
 
  Your betters have endured me say my mind,  
And if you cannot, best stop your ears. 
My tongue will tell the anger of my heart, 
Or else my heart concealing it will break. 
And rather than it shall, I will be free 
Even to the uttermost, as I please, in words.  
(4.3.75-80; my emphasis) 
 
Katherine physically intimidates those who are weaker and, when faced with superior force, 
secures her will through non-cooperation: “I see a woman may be made a fool  /  If she had 
not a spirit to resist” (3.2.220-221). She clings tenaciously to this stance, projecting hostile 
motives onto the people around her (2.1.31-34), though naturally such behaviour simply 
reinforces her isolation. Hooker’s assessment of Calvin’s behaviour in justfying Genevan 
discipline might justly be applied to Katherine: “Nature worketh in us all a love to our own 
counsels….Our love set on fire to maintain that which once we have done, sharpeneth the wit 
to dispute, to argue, and by all means to reason for it” (Pref. 2.7). 
 
Education  
 
 In the Laws, Hooker strives not merely to refute but to teach his opponents. Education 
should not merely indoctrinate the subject but awakening her critical capacity, and end of 
education is the result of a gradual, arduous process: “The soul of man being therefore at the 
first as a book, wherein nothing is and yet all things may be imprinted; we are to search by 
what steps and degrees it riseth unto perfection of knowledge” (1.6.1).  As John S. Marshall 
argues, one of the cornerstones of Hooker’s position is that human beings are “hylomorphic,” 
i.e., creatures who learn not merely through intellect but also the testimony of the senses.19 
Education then must begin with the sensuous and rise by degrees to the spiritual, or, to put it 
a different way, move from external regiment to habit, and finally to internalisation. Hooker 
himself gives the example of food which illustrates the various orders of law in which 
humans participate (1.16.7). Along with clothing and shelter, food is not to be despised as 
merely “sensible,” not least because, in sustaining human life, it makes the pursuit of higher 
values possible. Indeed, the good things we pursue in life are “linked and as it were chained 
one to another; we labour to eat, and we eat to live, and we live to do good, and the good 
which we do is as seed sown with reference to a future harvest” (1.11.1).  
 
 Petruchio leads Katherine through a comparable process calculated to provoke self-
reflection. Despite its superficial arbitrariness, his method is a rational appeal, provoking her 
“natural thirst after knowledge” (Laws 1.7.7). Brian Morris notes that Petruchio’s tactics 
invite active learning in that Katherine must “work out, incident by incident, the significance 
of the instruction she is being given.”20 He begins his demonstration with “lower” matters of 
common experience and moves progressively toward “higher” truths. First, he forces 
Katherine to acknowledge her physical vulnerability by temporarily depriving her of food, 
sleep, and (new) clothing. Hooker argues that “Goodness doth not move by being, but by 
being apparent; and therefore many things are neglected which are most precious, only 
because the value of them lieth hid. Sensible Goodness is most apparent, near, and present; 
                                                           
19 Marshall, 93.  
20 Brian Morris, “Introduction,” in The Taming of the Shrew, (London: Methuen, 1981), 131-132. 
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which causeth the Appetite to be therewith strongly provoked” (Laws 1.7.6). Petruchio’s 
privation strategy secures Katherine’s complete attention by appealing both literally and 
figuratively to her appetites: “starv’d for meat, giddy for lack of sleep” (4.3.9). In so doing, 
he renders the value of common necessities “apparent”; indeed, the absence of food and 
clothing “is such an impediment, as till it be removed suffereth not the mind of man to admit 
any other care” (Laws 1.10.2).   
 
 This strategy is further calculated to show Katherine that her access to physical 
necessities is a blessing bestowed by her Creator and derived specifically through 
participation in the social order she scorns. As a woman from a wealthy mercantile family, 
she has come to expect material benefits as her due, for Baptista, whatever his failings as a 
father, has always provided his daughters with the best: “I will be very kind, and liberal / To 
mine own children in good bringing up” (1.1.98-99).  Yet, according to Hooker, human 
beings err when they claim material necessities as an inalienable right, for “when we come to 
consider of food, as of a benefit which God of his bounteous goodness hath provided for all 
things living . . . . the law of Reason doth here require the duty of thankfulness at our hands, 
towards him at whose hands we have it” (Laws 1.16.7). The sin of unthankfulness, in fact, 
undermines genuine enjoyment of material things in the impious “because they receive it not 
as at God’s hands, which only consideration maketh temporal blessings comfortable” (Laws 
5.76.4). Petruchio attempts to teach Katherine, “who never knew how to entreat” (4.3.7), this 
principle of thankfulness in both the saying of grace at the table (4.1.159) and his demand 
that she acknowledge the human source of the benefit: “The poorest service is repaid with 
thanks,  / And so shall mine before you touch the meat” (4.3.45-46).   
 
 Inferior goods, argues Hooker, must never be pursued as ends in themselves, but 
rather ordinately within a normative hierarchy of value: “As things of greatest necessity are 
always first provided for, so things of greatest dignity are most accounted of by all such as 
judge rightly” (1.10.2). Hooker does not despise material wealth (neither, of course, does the 
prudently acquisitive Petruchio), but rather insists that the good life is a synthesis of the 
material and the ideal: “Unto life many implements are necessary; more, if we seek (as all 
men naturally do) such a life as hath in it joy, comfort, delight, and pleasure” (1.10.2). 
Comparatively speaking, though, “the graces of the Spirit are much more precious than 
worldly benefits; our ghostly evils of greater importance than any harm which the body 
feeleth” (5.35.2). Even such unequivocally desirable ends such as health, virtue, and 
knowledge are insufficient as ultimate values (1.11.1). Conversely, when human desire is 
rationally ordered and healthy, we prefer greater goods to the lesser and experience 
satisfaction, the perfection of life.21  For Hooker, this balanced, integrated life is available 
only within a stable social order, which provides us with the necessities but also encourages 
us not to overvalue them.  
 
 Petruchio’s pedagogy is similarly calculated to expose Katherine’s disordered, 
solipsistic values. Without, for example, some reference to a natural end, her desire for a cap 
that “doth fit the time” (4.3.69) or a “quaint” dress (4.3.102) is superficial and materialistic. 
Katherine, it would seem, demands the material benefits of social participation without 
accepting the “yoke” of civility and mutuality. This is suggested by her testy remark, “Love 
me, or love me not, I like the cap, / And it I will have, or I will have none” (4.3.84-85), 
signifying that she values fashion more than her conjugal love (her trampling of the cap under 
foot in 5.2. is in part a demonstration that her values have been transformed). Petruchio 
                                                           
21 Marshall, 95-96, 99. 
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insists that fashionable caps are fine if material sophistication is properly subordinated to the 
cultivation of virtue: “When you are gentle, you shall have one too”; “‘tis the mind that 
makes the body rich”; “honor peereth in the meanest habit” (4.3.71, 172, 174). 
 
 The privation strategy is also calculated to make Katherine dissatisfied with her 
emotional isolation. It establishes a stark contrast between antithetical modes of living –  bare 
subsistence and fullness – for the misery produced by irascibility implies its opposite: “thou 
false deluding slave,  / That feed’st me with the very name of meat” (4.3.30-31).  Through 
deprivation she comes to realize that she is not only famished for food, but longs for other, 
less tangible goods such as familial love and public esteem, which cannot be experienced if 
she persists in anti-sociality. This process of self-discovery can be explicated in reference to 
the law of moral reciprocity dramatized by Hooker: “if I cannot wish to receive all good, 
even as much at every man’s hand as any man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look 
to have any part of my desire which is undoubtedly in other men, we all being of one and the 
same nature? To have any thing offered them repugnant to this desire must needs in all 
respects grieve them as much as me: so that if I do harm I must look to suffer; there being no 
reason that others should shew greater measure of love to me than they have by me shewed 
unto them. My desire therefore to be loved of my equals in nature as much as possible may 
be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing them-ward fully the like affection” (1.8.7). 
The good life, insists Hooker, can only be achieved through the practice of the second great 
commandment. 
 
 Like Petruchio, Hooker persistently strives to engage the rationality and will of his 
readers. He does not wish to effect in them a “captivity of judgment,” so that the “authority of 
men should prevail either against or above Reason” (2.7.6). Rather, a polemical victory is 
only authentic when, the alternatives being clearly delineated, one’s opponent assents through 
free rational choice: “To choose is to will one thing before another. And to will is to bend our 
souls to the having or doing of that which they see to be good” (1.7.2). Yet, in the real world, 
all choices entail undesirable consequences, and any particular object will have “the show of 
some difficulty or unpleasant quality annexed to it, in respect whereof the Will may shrink 
and decline it” (1.7.6). When reason is properly exercised, however, the alternatives are 
weighed in reference not simply to superficial difficulties but to higher ends like the 
attainment of happiness.  
 
 At the same time, argues Hooker, education is not exclusively rationalistic, nor is the 
end of education mere self-interest, for no one can rest satisfied “either with fruition of that 
wherewith his life is preserved, or with performance of such actions as advance him most 
deservedly in estimation” (1.11.4). The best kind of education is motivated by the subject’s 
intuition of a supreme good (i.e., God) beyond empirical or rational inquiry. We covet, he 
argues, “that which exceedeth the reach of sense; yea somewhat above capacity of reason, 
somewhat divine and heavenly, which with hidden exultation it rather surmiseth than 
conceiveth; somewhat it seeketh, and what that is directly it knoweth not, yet very intentive 
desire thereof doth so incite it, that all other known delights and pleasures are laid aside, they 
give place to the search of this but only suspected desire” (1.11.4). Clearly, Hooker’s praise 
of rationality does not preclude his appreciation for visionary and mystical modes of 
apprehension. The undoubted earthly goods of “beauties, honours, sciences, virtues, and 
perfections” point toward a “last and highest state of perfection” which is “sought and 
earnestly thirsted for” (1.11.4-5). 
 
 A similar balance of rational and visionary apprehension is evident in Petruchio’s 
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pedagogy. Although at times he seems to disregard Katherine’s volition by abrogating or 
wilfully misunderstanding her wishes,22 his methods are directed primarily toward her 
voluntary assent. She must choose him clear-sightedly, fully aware of his imperfections. This 
is one way of understanding his raucous behaviour in Acts Four and Five. Rather than 
constructing an artificially harmonious atmosphere or projecting an idealized image of 
himself as in the ‘Petrarchan’ wooing of the Lucentio-Bianca plot, Petruchio openly displays, 
exaggerates even, his worst traits: insensitivity, imperiousness, violence. Nor does he 
disguise the fact that there are clear disadvantages in submitting to him, not least that she 
must relinquish the sheer pleasure of “crossing” him. Not surprisingly, then, Katherine 
withholds her assent throughout most of Act Four, though the text does not clearly specify 
the reason.  Possibly, the full meaning of his demonstration eludes her, or dropping her 
habitual irascibility proves too difficult. Hooker notes that “custom inuring the mind by long 
practice, and so leaving there a sensible impression, prevaileth more than reasonable 
persuasion” and that even though “Reason . . . may rightly discern the thing which is good, . . 
. yet the Will of man may not incline itself thereunto” (Laws 1.7.6). The stasis of her will is 
implied in Curtis’s description of the bride on her wedding night: “she, poor soul, / Knows 
not which way to stand, to look, to speak,  / And sits as one new risen from a dream” 
(4.1.172-174). When she finally does submit to Petruchio, however, she does so on rational 
and practical grounds, for assenting to his absurd assertions about the sun and the moon 
brings about the concrete result of forward progress:  
 
   Hor. Say as he says, or we shall never go. 
   Kath. Forward, I pray, since we have come so far.  
           (4.5.11-12)  
 
 Yet Petruchio’s demonstration also transcends rationality in some respects, leading 
Katherine toward a visionary apprehension of her place within the cosmic order. The 
solar/lunar imagery prominent in the scene is reminiscent of Hooker’s famous description of 
cosmic interdependence: “For we see the whole world and each part thereof so compacted, 
that as long as each thing performeth only that work which is natural unto it, it thereby 
preserveth both other things and also itself. Contrariwise, let any principal thing, as the sun, 
the moon, any one of the heavens or elements, but once cease or fail, or swerve, and who 
doth not easily conceive that the sequel thereof would be ruin both to itself and whatsoever 
dependeth on it?” (1.9.1). To endorse Petruchio’s nonsensical assertions about the heavenly 
bodies, Katherine must temporarily suspend her rationality and symbolically relinquish her 
autonomy for interdependence. Once she does so, however, her vision is transformed vision 
and her condition altered: “Pardon, old father, my mistaking eyes,  /  That have been so 
bedazzled with the sun, / That every thing I look on seemeth green.”(4.5.45-47). In words 
which echo the marriage vows, Katherine accepts the condition of interdependence -- 
“Henceforth I vow it shall be so for me”; “And so shall it be so for Katherine” (4.5.15, 22) -- 
and the immediate result is a flowering of affection and humour between the partners. If, in 
Hooker’s terms, Katherine’s refusal of social integration constitutes a “swerving” from the 
natural order, the restoration of this order is conveyed in Petruchio’s benediction: “Well, 
forward, forward. Thus the bowl should run, / And not unluckily against the bias” (4.5.24-
25).  
 
 The entire pedagogical process results in intellectual and moral growth for Katherine.  
The “tamed” woman of the final scene exhibits newfound flexibility, perceptiveness, poise, 
                                                           
22 See Shrew, 2.1.271, 275; 3.2.202-203; 4.3.81-83. 
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and eloquence: “she is chang’d, as she had never been” (5.2.115). In her final speech, 
Katherine confesses to having allowed pride and peevishness to distort her judgment: “My 
mind hath been as big, as one of yours, / My heart as great, my reason haply more, / To 
bandy word for word and frown for frown” (5.2.170-72). This is precisely the sort of self-
evaluation which Hooker hopes his opponents will undergo: “The best and safest way for you 
therefore, my dear brethren, is, to call your deeds past to a new reckoning, to reexamine the 
cause ye have taken in hand, . . . to lay aside the gall of that bitterness wherein your minds 
have hitherto over-abounded, and with meekness to search the truth. Think ye are men, deem 
it not impossible for you to err; sift unpartially your own hearts, whether it be force of reason 
or vehemency of affection, which hath bred and still doth feed these opinions in you. If truth 
do any where manifest itself, seek not to smother it with glosing delusions, acknowledge the 
greatness thereof, and think it your best victory when the same doth prevail over you” 
(Pref.9.1).  
 
Order and Mutuality 
 
In an age when the ‘marginal’ and ‘transgressive’ are valorized, the unsympathetic 
treatment of dissent in Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity and The Taming of the Shrew – by 
religious minorities and women, respectively – cannot help but come off badly. Critics 
sometimes under-value these works because allegedly they celebrate the dominant ideologies 
of patriarchal and political absolutism. Undoubtedly, both works appear, from a 
contemporary standpoint, politically conservative, affirming the primacy of order, continuity, 
and obedience, and manifesting a corresponding anxiety about the chaotic effects of dissent. 
The Laws and Shrew also insist on the necessity of social discipline and coercive force, a sore 
point for several critics who argue that the presence of coercion in any form or to any degree 
cancels out considerations of mutuality.23 However, such reductive readings fail to do justice 
to the two texts. Hooker, for example, defends the Elizabethan social order by placing the 
issues of conformity and obedience in a broad teleological context,24 and in so doing de-
emphasizes but does not deny their hierarchical and coercive aspects. As Debora Shuger 
points out, Hooker observes in a clear-eyed way that all societies “are maintained by power, 
not philia,” the more so when they are inclusive societies.25  Moreover, as Charles Watterson 
Davis argues, Hooker’s political position cannot be labelled either royal absolutism or 
Enlightenment individualism, for neither law nor individual rights are primary; there is rather 
an insistence on interdependence within hierarchy.26 Further, as A.S. McGrade contends, 
Hooker’s preference for stability does not preclude a positive appreciation for actions, 
processes, and constructive change.27  
                                                           
23 W. Speed Hill, for example, laments the “repressive and authoritarian bias” in Hooker’s thought which 
renders Hooker’s terms for reconciliation with the non-conformists “illusory” (“Evolution,” 152-153), while 
MacDonald makes a similar point in reference to Shrew, arguing that, for all its gestures toward playful 
mutuality, the play can never “entirely escape the shadow of coercion,” for “we cannot have play and 
reciprocity on the one hand and coercion on the other” (Comedies, 19). 
24 Paul E. Forte, “Richard Hooker’s theory of law,” Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 12:2 (1982): 
141. 
25 Debora Shuger, “‘Society Supernatural’: the Imagined Community of Hooker’s Laws,” in Religion and 
Culture in Renaissance England, eds. Claire McEachern and Debora Shuger, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 128. 
26 Charles Watterson Davis, “‘For conformities sake’: How Richard Hooker Used Fuzzy Logic and Legal 
Rhetoric against Political Extremes,” in Richard Hooker and the Construction of Christian Community, ed. A.S. 
McGrade, (Tempe, AZ: Medieval & Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1997), 338, 345-346. See also Philip B. 
Secor, “In Search of Richard Hooker,” in Richard Hooker and the Construction of Christian Community, ed. 
A.S. McGrade, (Tempe, AZ: Medieval & Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1997), 21-37.  
27 McGrade, “Establishment,” 17. 
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Hooker’s conception of the social order can be characterized as anti-utopian and anti-
idealist;28 as McGrade argues, he defends neither a utopian ideal nor the English status quo 
but rather a “set of actually promulgated public norms.”29 For Hooker, ideologues who argue 
for a return to either Edenic or apostolic purity are unrealistic and irresponsible: “to bring 
things unto the first course they were in, and utterly to take away all kind of public 
government in the world, were apparently to overturn the whole world” (1.10.4). While 
Hooker admits that, theoretically, “men might have lived without any public regiment,” he 
insists that we cannot now turn back the clock, ignoring either historical change or our self-
evident need for some form of government in a fallen world. Yet he is not dogmatic with 
respect to the particular form of social regiment: “the kinds thereof being many, Nature tieth 
not to any one, but leaveth the choice as a thing arbitrary” (1.10.5). All political authority is 
based on consent and is therefore socially legitimated,30 while laws of descent like 
primogeniture are often based on mere probability, fitness, convenience, or expediency 
(1.10.10-11). Moreover, Hooker argues that many “truths” considered absolute in a given 
time and place are in fact a matter of probability rather than certainty. Since “proof infallible” 
is not available in many instances (notably in the correct form of church polity), we must be 
content to make decisions on the basis of incomplete or ambiguous evidence:  “As for 
probabilities, what thing was there ever set down so agreeable with sound reason, but some 
probable shew against it might be made?” (Pref.6.6). 
 
 Constructed, imperfect, and mutable as it is, argues Hooker, the social order as it 
currently exists is essential to human welfare, conferring inestimable benefits for those who 
render themselves “conformable” to it. We should pay close attention to the voice of tradition 
and custom which are often valuable guides: “The most certain token of evident goodness is, 
if the general persuasion of all men do so account it . . . . The general and perpetual voice of 
men is as the sentence of God himself” (1.8.3).  Undoubtedly, human traditions and 
institutions deteriorate, and abuses necessitate innovations such as the Protestant 
Reformation. Yet, since “corporations are immortal,” legitimate reform can only occur 
through a rational process of consultation and persuasion, and the consent of our ancestors to 
a particular rule of law continues in force until amended by universal consent (1.10.8). Short 
of such consensus, subjects are morally obliged to conform to the established order: “sith 
equity and reason, the law of nature, God and man, do all favour that which is in being, till 
orderly judgment of decision be given against it; it is but justice to exact of you, and 
perverseness in you it should be to deny thereunto your willing obedience” (Pref.6.5). 
 
The social vision in Shrew, like that of Hooker, is not easily categorized as either 
conservative or subversive. As Graham Holderness argues, it is as implausible to force the 
play into the mould of modern progressive or feminist thought as it is to dismiss it as “a 
‘barbaric and disgusting’ relic of medieval misogyny,” for the play contains elements of both 
hierarchical social doctrine and subversive, anti-paternalist discourse. 31 Like the Laws, for 
example, the play frankly accepts the necessity of coercive authority, rationalizing and 
contextualizing it on the same grounds that Hooker does in the Laws. For example, the 
                                                           
28 Rowan Williams, in “Hooker: Philosopher, Anglican, Contemporary,” Richard Hooker and the Construction 
of Christian Community, ed. A.S. McGrade, (Tempe, AZ: Medieval & Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1997), 
argues that Hooker employs a radical apologetic in defence of a conservative position (377-378). Bouwsma 
comments on Hooker’s subversive anthropology, pragmatism, and historicism, which place him “in opposition 
to idealist Christian thought” (Bouwsma, 152). 
29 McGrade, “Establishment,” 18. 
30 See Bouwsma, 152. 
31 Graham Holderness, The Taming of the Shrew, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), 22-23. 
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prevalence of animal-training metaphors implies that punitive discipline is sometimes 
necessary and beneficent: “He that knows better how to tame a shrew, / Now let him speak, 
‘tis charity to shew” (4.1.210-211). Yet, as a number of critics have persuasively argued, the 
play effectively synthesizes hierarchical doctrine with a discourse of mutuality.32   
 
Petruchio manifests a somewhat ambivalent attitude toward the social order.  At 
times, he speaks like an avatar of patrilineal authority. For example, he presumes that his 
wooing of Katherine will thrive on the basis of patriarchal affiliation (1.2.100-101; 2.1.116). 
Later, he reassures Vincentio that, despite appearances to the contrary, his son Lucentio has 
flouted neither patriarchal authority nor mercantile prudence: 
 
 Happily met, the happier for thy son. 
 And now by law, as well as reverend age 
 I may entitle thee my loving father. 
 The sister to my wife, this gentlewoman, 
 Thy son by this hath married. Wonder not,  
 Nor be grieved. She is of good esteem, 
 Her dowry wealthy, and of worthy birth; 
 Beside, so qualified as may beseem 
 The spouse of any noble gentleman. 
 Let me embrace with old Vincentio. . . . 
        (4.5.59-68) 
 
Strangely, Petruchio is quick to adopt Vincentio as a surrogate father, as he does earlier with 
Baptista (2.1.130). As the sole heir to the estate of old Antonio (2.1.117) with no living father 
to gainsay his choices, Petruchio enjoys an enviable level of autonomy and financial 
security.33 This makes his voluntary identification with the fathers in the play all the more 
striking. It would seem that Petruchio, one of many young men blown seed-like through the 
world to seek their fortunes (1.2.49-50), is anxious about his isolation and seeks social 
affiliation through marriage and the acquisition of capital.  
 
 Yet, at other times, Petruchio’s stance toward civil society seems subversive. His 
hasty manner of wooing, for example, can be seen as an intentional mockery of bourgeois 
social propriety; Katherine speaks of him, with justification, as “hiding his bitter jests in blunt 
behavior” (3.2.13). Even when contextualized as part of his “male shrew” guise, his 
behaviour at the wedding -- refusing to be questioned or entreated, cuffing the priest, 
throwing the sops in the sexton’s face – suggests contempt for authority: “Go to the feast, 
revel and domineer, / Carouse full measure to her maidenhead, / Be mad and merry, or go 
hang yourselves” (3.2.224-226). Petruchio’s unruly behaviour seems part way between the 
strategic and the temperamental; perhaps his zest in flouting convention is partially driven by 
hostility toward the “system.” Clearly, both partners possess wilful, anti-social tendencies:  
“By this reckoning he is more shrew than she” (4.1.85-86).34 Accordingly, Petruchio 
recognizes that he and Katherine, “two raging fires” (2.1.132), must voluntarily subject 
                                                           
32 John C. Bean,  in “Comic Structure and the Humanizing of Kate in The Taming of the Shrew,” in The 
Woman’s Part: Feminist Criticism of Shakespeare, eds. Carolyn Ruth Swift Lenz, Gayle Greene, and Carol 
Thomas Neely, (Urbana: University of Southern Illinois Press, 1980), contends that the play advocates a 
“nontyrannical hierarchy informed by mutual affection” (70). Mikesell calls the play a vision of mutuality 
within hierarchy (143, 154). See also George Walton Williams, “Kate and Petruchio: Strength and Love,” 
English Language Notes 29 (1991): 19-21.  
33 Moisan, 113. 
34 See Peter Saccio, “Shrewd and Kindly Farce,” Shakespeare Survey 37 (1985): 33-40. 
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themselves  a disciplinary regime if they are to avert mutual destruction:  
 
   I tell thee, Kate, ‘twas burnt and dried away, 
   And I expressly am forbid to touch it;  
   For it engenders choler, planteth anger, 
   And better ‘twere that both of us did fast, 
   Since of ourselves, ourselves are choleric,  
   Than feed it with such overroasted flesh.  
          (4.1.170-175) 
 
 The Taming of the Shrew, like Hooker’s Laws, manifests a sustained tension between 
conservative precept and radical methodology.35 Marianne Novy contends that Petruchio’s 
methods mediate between the poles of hierarchy/coercion and play/mutuality, and in so doing 
combine in a compelling way “the rhetoric of order and the energy of disorder, while 
removing the dangers of both poles.”36  This tension is evident in Petruchio’s equivocal 
approach to material wealth and commodities. On the one hand, his blunt pursuit of a wealthy 
wife (1.2.75-76) and his shrewd calculations throughout the play (1.2.214-15; 5.2.111-18) 
indicate his acceptance of mercantile values. On the other hand, his use of commodities, 
clothing in particular, suggests otherwise. At Petruchio’s instigation, clothing is soiled in the 
mud (4.1.74-80), the tailor’s work disparaged (4.3.86-168), and caps trodden under foot 
(5.2.121-122). Tranio says, “oftentimes he goes but mean-apparell’d” (3.2.73), and this 
flouting of sartorial codes reaches its zenith when Petruchio arrives at the wedding in 
outlandish, mismatched attire (3.2.42-48). His motley ensemble is at least in part a defiance 
of the codes of  bourgeois respectability, a fact not lost on Baptista: “Fie, doff this habit, 
shame to your estate, / An eyesore to our solemn festival” (3.2.100-101). More importantly, it 
is an oblique message to Katherine, and invitation for her to see social conventions qua 
conventions. As Martha Andresen-Thom argues, Petruchio satirically attacks “those arbitrary 
rules and roles of social appearance and behavior that so drastically shrink expressiveness 
and limit insight into ourselves and others,” separating “person from clothing, character from 
role, gentleness of spirit from gentility of birth and class.”37  
 
 Yet Petruchio’s violation of convention, as Carol Heffernan contends, does not appear 
to signify permanent rebellion against the values of his society and caste.38 His behaviour 
suggests, not a rejection civil society,  but a neat balancing act, by which he treats the 
patriarchal social order with both positive appreciation and ironic detachment. Just as Hooker 
tries to convince sensitive puritans that Christians “may lawfully doubt and suspend our 
judgment, inclining neither to one side nor other” (Laws 2.7.5) even in matters divine, 
Petruchio obliquely suggests to Katherine that masculine dominance in marriage may be 
considered one of those matters of which “we may very well retain an opinion that they are 
probable and not unlikely to be true” (Laws 2.7.5). He demonstrates to her the value of being 
outwardly compliant or “conformable,” adhering to cultural forms based on probable rather 
than certain authority. In so doing, he models for her a way of negotiating personal identity in 
                                                           
35 Ann Thompson, “Introduction,” The Taming of the Shrew, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 
37. See also Moisan, 120. 
36 Marianne L. Novy, “Patriarchy and Play in The Taming of the Shrew,” English Literary Renaissance 9 
(1979): 269, 279. 
37 Martha Andresen-Thom, “Shrew-Taming and Other Rituals of Aggression: Baiting and Bonding on the Stage 
and in the Wild,” Women’s Studies 9 (1982): 132. 
37 Carol F. Heffernan, “The Taming of the Shrew: The Bourgeoisie in Love,” Essays in Literature 12 (1985): 11-
12. 
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which the benefits of social participation can be enjoyed without surrendering or 
compromising the subjective inner space which Hooker calls “conscience.” 
 
 This position is presented, obliquely but powerfully, in Act Four, scene five, during 
which the protagonists symbolically resolve their mutual ambivalence toward each other and 
the patriarchal social order. In the first part of the scene Petruchio persuades Katherine to 
accept his conjugal authority, but he does so in a way that ironically brackets this authority, 
implying that it is adiaphora rather than dogmatically true. Clearly, neither he nor Katherine 
believe sun and moon have literally changed places, but she finally accepts his assertions in a 
spirit of play:  
 
   Then God be blest, it is the blessed sun, 
   But sun it is not, when you say it is not;  
   And the moon changes even as your mind. 
   What you will have it nam’d, even that it is, 
   And so it shall be so for Katherine.  
           (4.5.18-22)  
 
As Novy argues, Katherine discovers that the best way to deal with the arbitrary and 
irrational demands of patriarchy is to stop taking them so seriously, to view the assumptions 
of her culture with detachment, like the rules of a game.39  
 
 Yet Petruchio’s demonstration also implies that, while patriarchal authority may not 
be objectively true, it is “that which is in being” (Laws Pref.6.5), an established order 
sanctioned by custom and “the general persuasion of all men” (Laws 1.8.3). Without a broad 
consensus for reform, one cannot defy it without seriously undermining peace and good 
order. One is therefore obliged, as Coppelia Kahn accurately observes of Katherine, to walk a 
tightrope between external conformity to the doctrine of male superiority and its interrogation 
through irony.40 Petruchio models this position in his carnivalistic mockery of Vincentio, in 
which he and Katherine mutually participate. First, Katherine, at Petruchio’s instigation, 
delivers a mock encomium on Vincentio’s youthful, feminine beauty; then, Petruchio 
“corrects” her, pointing out, still rather disrespectfully, that Vincentio is “old, wrinkled, 
faded, withered” (4.5.43); finally, Katherine and Petruchio apologize in elaborate terms, 
asking, in an exaggeratedly abject manner, to be reconciled to patriarchal authority: “Now I 
perceive thou art a reverend father. /  Pardon, I pray thee, for my mad mistaking” (4.5.48-49). 
This word game in which the taxonomies of youth and age, male and female, are inverted 
suggests the provisional and customary nature of social identities and distinctions, their 
dependence on convention and consensus.  Further, as Andresen-Thom argues, the mockery 
of authority figures and institutions is an important dimension of social renewal, for 
traditional forms like courtship and marriage are best served when each generation “first 
reject[s], then invert[s], then make[s] these forms their own.”41  
 
 Like Hooker’s Laws, The Taming of the Shrew is anti-utopian in its treatment of the 
social order. This is evident in the play’s final scene, which far from being a serene, festive 
conclusion, foregrounds the persistence of rivalry and hostility in Paduan society. At the 
beginning of the scene, Lucentio speaks as if all conflict has ceased: “our jarring notes agree, 
/ And time it is, when raging war is done, / To smile at scapes and perils overblown” (5.2.1-
                                                           
39 Novy, 273. 
40 Kahn, 97. 
41 Andresen-Thom, 140.  
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3). But as the guests “sit to chat as well as eat” (5.2.11), the veneer of social harmony wears 
thin. Interpersonal tensions erupt as the “quick-witted folks / . . . butt together” competitively 
(5.2.38-39). The rhythm of aggression, kept in check by social tact, continues throughout the 
scene, culminating in the wager sequence and Kate’s long speech on feminine duty, both of 
which refocus the hostilities onto Bianca and Hortensio’s widow, the newly discovered 
“shrews.” 
 
 As Hooker argues, there is little point in trying to eradicate aggression; if the book of 
Genesis demonstrates the inevitability of violence when only a single human family was 
present, we can expect no less in a world of many clans, communities, and nations: “how 
could it be chosen but that when families were multiplied and increased upon earth, after 
separation each providing for itself, envy, strife, contention and violence must grow amongst 
them? For hath not Nature furnished man with wit and valour, as it were with armour, which 
may be used as well unto extreme evil as good?” (1.10.3). As his last phrase implies, 
aggression is not wholly separable from admirable human qualities like wit and valour. 
Rather than try to eliminate aggression, the better solution is to contain it and channel it 
toward socially valuable ends. Such redirection of energies is arguably the precise 
achievement of Petruchio and Katherine at the end of Shrew.  Frances Dolan contends that 
Katherine learns “how to assert dominance in more socially acceptable ways. . . not to be less 
violent, but to redirect her violence toward more appropriate targets.”42  Similarly, says David 
Daniell, the two of them “embrace and give form to violence” through acting, containing 
aggression and rebellion within the “mutual frame” of marriage.43   
 
Marriage and Happiness 
 
 Hooker is an eloquent proponent of human happiness as a natural end and normative 
standard for human life. In his view, the desire for happiness is universal: “Our felicity 
therefore being the object and accomplishment of our desire, we cannot choose but wish and 
covet it” (1.8.1). Though we never attain perfection in this life, we may enjoy relative 
happiness in the degree to which our desires are satisfied and our true end embraced: 
“Happiness therefore is that estate whereby we attain, so far as possibly may be attained, the 
full possession of that which simply for itself is to be desired, and containeth in it after an 
eminent sort the contentation of our desires, the highest degree of all our perfection” (1.11.3). 
He further argues that, despite its limits, social life is the necessary precondition for 
individual fulfilment, for civil society, with its interlocking constraints and privileges, 
provides the optimal environment for the perfection of persons. Conformity to natural and 
civil law issues in “our sovereign good or blessedness, that wherein the highest degree of all 
our perfection consisteth . . . . and therefore with it our souls are fully content and satisfied, in 
that they have they rejoice, and thirst for no more” (1.11.1).  
 
Paradoxically, though, individual fulfilment can only be realized when the members 
of a social body are willing to subordinate their individual interests to the common good. 
Indeed, he argues, only through such acts of trust can the social order, on which we all 
depend, be sustained. A clear illustration of this principle is provided by marriage, which 
Hooker defines as the permanent conjunction of man and woman, and the singular source of 
“propagation” which makes any society “durable” (5.73.1). Every other purpose must be 
subordinated to the principal end of “the having and the bringing up of children” (5.73.2), 
                                                           
42 Frances E. Dolan, The Taming of the Shrew: Texts and Contexts, (Boston: Bedford Books of St. Martin’s 
Press, 1996), 24.  
43 David Daniell, “The Good Marriage of Katherine and Petruchio,” Shakespeare Survey 37 (1985): 30. 
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including all considerations of happiness, personal fulfilment, and equality. Marriage is not, 
Hooker argues, an ideal state, for “choice seeketh rather proportion then absolute perfection 
of goodness” (5.73.2). Like all human institutions it consists of interlocking privileges and 
limitations, and the man or woman who enters into it can expect to experience “travail” as 
well as joy, freedom and the constraint of a “strait and insoluble knot” (5.73.2). 
 
Hooker’s view of marriage is far from equalitarian. On an ideal plane, implies 
Hooker, equality between the sexes might seem desirable, but in the larger scheme of things, 
this is not the case. Pragmatically speaking, marriages, like all social relations, function most 
harmoniously when hierarchical order is observed: “it was not possible they [men and 
women] could concur unless there were subalternation between them, which subalternation is 
naturally grounded upon inequality, because things equal in every respect are never willingly 
directed one by another“ (5.73.2). Yet in Hooker’s view inequality does not preclude 
mutuality but rather facilitates it. As Davis points out, Hooker draws the term 
“subalternation” from logic; it signifies a cooperative, though not equal, relation between the 
two parts of a proposition: X and Y together. Davis argues that Hooker envisions by the term 
not mere subordination but interdependence, complementarity of function, and cooperation.44 
Husbands and wives, like all members of the body politic, share significant common interests 
which may be realized through social participation. The wedding ring, he says, is an 
appropriate symbol for marriage because it speaks of mutual love and is “a pledge of 
conjunction in heart and mind agreed upon between them” (5.73.6).  
 
 For Hooker, male interests are by no means absolute but bounded by warrants and 
qualifications,45 but he does not disguise the fact that marriage imposes greater restraint on 
women than men. In marrying, a woman relinquishes the relative autonomy of single life but 
gains in compensation a broadened sphere for personal fulfilment. Marriage not only confers 
important non-material social benefits like “dignity,” “conjugal honour,” “affection,” and 
“worship,” but legal and economic benefits as well: “her children became by this mean 
legitimate and free; herself was made a mother over his family; last of all she received such 
advancement of state as things annexed unto his person might augment her with, yea a right 
of participation was thereby given her both in him and even in all things which were his” 
(5.73.7). In short, marriage is a principal means to the good life for both women and men:  
“By good things temporal therefore we mean length of days, health of body, store of friends 
and well-willers, quietness, prosperous success of those things we take in hand, riches with fit 
opportunities to use them during life, reputation following us both alive and dead, children or 
such as instead of children we wish to leave successors and partakers of our happiness. These 
things are naturally every man’s desire, because they are good” (5.76.2). 
 
 The Taming of the Shrew posits comparable assertions about the relation between 
individual happiness, marriage, and the social order. Petruchio, who “hope[s] good days and 
long to see” (1.2.191), grounds his hopes for felicity in marriage: “Marry, peace it bodes, and 
love, and quiet life, / An aweful rule, and right supremacy; / And, to be short, what not, that’s 
sweet and happy” (5.2.108-110). This is a clear expression of both hierarchy and 
subalternation, as is his statement to Baptista, which, though outrageous in context, is 
proleptically truthful: 
 
 Be patient, gentlemen, I choose her for myself. 
                                                           
44 Davis, 345-346. 
45 For example, Hooker repeats St. Paul’s dictum that “parties married have not any longer entire power over 
themselves, but each hath interest in other’s person” (5.73.7). See Davis, 347. 
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 If she and I be pleas’d, what's that to you? 
 ‘Tis bargain’d ‘twixt us twain, being alone, 
 That she shall still be curst in company. 
 I tell you ‘tis incredible to believe 
 How much she loves me. . . . 
          (2.1.300-305)       
           
Here, the emphasis is on pleasure, mutuality, and affect, though the prerogative of choice 
remains male. As Alexander Leggatt argues, although pleasure and pastime lie at the heart of 
the play’s vision of social life, the play demonstrates that “our most pleasurable activities are 
organized, limited, bounded by rules; and Petruchio’s ultimate lesson may be that order and 
pleasure are inseparable.”46    
 
 But, if the husband enjoys “supremacy,” he also bears significant responsibility for 
his spouse’s welfare, and this can be seen as both a form of constraint and a demonstration of 
reciprocity.  Throughout the play, Petruchio demonstrates diligence on Katherine’s behalf, 
providing her with a generous marriage settlement (2.1.123-127), a music tutor (2.1.55-60), 
wedding apparel (2.1.314-317), and personally prepared meals (4.3.39-40). Moreover, during 
the honeymoon, he “fast[s] for company” (4.3.177), denying himself food and sleep in order 
to facilitate her transformation. Katherine also recognizes the value of such exertions in her 
final speech, where she preaches not only wifely submission, but it also masculine self-
sacrifice: 
 
   Thy husband is thy lord, thy life, thy keeper, 
   Thy head, thy sovereign, one that cares for thee,  
   And for thy maintenance; commits his body 
   To painful labor, both by sea and land;  
   To watch the night in storms, the day in cold, 
   Whilst thou li’st warm at home, secure and safe;  
   And craves no other tribute at thy hands 
   But love, fair looks, and true obedience -- 
   Too little payment for so great a debt.   
          (5.2.146-154)   
   
Whatever its precise degree of sincerity, the speech clearly articulates a subalternate and 
reciprocal view of marital relations: solicitude and sacrifice are repaid with love and 
obedience. While marriage thus constrains both men and women, it confers an even greater 
range of benefits.  
 
 In the end, Katherine perceives that the marital state is the one best suited to fulfill her 
natural desires for happiness, since it coordinates the major aspects of her nature: “Man doth 
seek a triple perfection: first a sensual, consisting in those things which very life itself 
requireth either as necessary supplements, or as beauties and ornaments thereof; then an 
intellectual, consisting in those things which none underneath man is either capable of or 
acquainted with; lastly a spiritual and divine, consisting in those things whereunto we tend by 
supernatural means here, but cannot here attain unto them” (Laws 1.11.4). As Mikesell 
comments, “all the force of [Katherine’s] personality initially absorbed in peevish misery is 
allowed to blossom in the end in joyful defense of patriarchal marriage. Thus, the play 
                                                           
46 Alexander Leggatt, Shakespeare’s Comedy of Love, (London: Methuen, 1973) 59-60. 
JACOBSEN: ‘THE LAW OF A COMMONWEAL’: THE SOCIAL VISION OF HOOKER’S OF THE LAWS 
OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY AND SHAKESPEARE’S THE TAMING OF THE SHREW 
 
  
38 
 
suggests, it is only the bridle and bit of patriarchy that can liberate women’s power.”47       
 
Conclusion 
 
The thematic parallels between The Taming of the Shrew and Hooker’s Of the Laws of 
Ecclesiastical Polity are numerous. The two texts are informed by substantially the same 
assumptions about dissent and the nature of social affiliation. As McGrade says, Hooker was 
the “best sort of traditionalist”, a writer whose emphasis on outward conformity and the 
requirements of peace and order constitute an admirable attempt to accommodate diversity 
within a social and ecclesiastical unity.48 Similarly, The Taming of the Shrew articulates a 
broad, humane, and rational social vision in which reciprocity, mutuality, and community 
outweigh but do not negate the claims of individuality. Not only is Katherine reconciled to 
the social order through her recognition that marriage and communal life are superior to 
isolation, but the social order itself is enriched and renewed by its accommodation of her. In 
the end Petruchio and Katherine emerge as “winner[s]” (5.2.187), experiencing the “peace…, 
and love, and quiet life” (5.108) which are the fruits of sociality, without sacrificing the rich 
inwardness that makes them such vital and engaging personalities. 
 
                                                           
47 Mikesell, 159. 
48 McGrade, “Establishment,”  26. Forte also argues that Hooker’s approach constitutes a wise, humane, and 
forward-looking approach to religious differences, paving the way for religious freedoms in the following 
century (157).   
